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AN INTERNATIONAL PEACE COURT
BY THOMAS HOLTON

Martinus NijhoJJ: The Hague, 1970. Pp. xii, 112.

T

HE prevention, regulation and control of international conflicts is a desirable objective. Aptly enshrined in the preamble and the first two articles of the United Nations Charter,1
this objective has been repeatedly affirmed in various U.N.
resolutions and declarations, including the recent "Declaration
on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in Accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations,"2 which was adopted without
vote in the General Assembly on October 24, 1970.
However, the almost universal condemnation and prohibition of the use of interstate violence is not reflected by state
conduct. Nor has this consensus on prevention of violence, as
codified in the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, 3 the League of Nations Covenant, 4 and the U.N. Charter,5 been translated into
structuring authoritative institutions providing adequate pacific
means of settling international disputes. The result is the
prevalence of major and minor conflicts, spread over every
continent and involving not only super powers but various
middle and small states, and even mini states. And the goal
of world peace seems as illusory as ever.
It is not that statesmen and publicists do not recognize the
problem. But the fact is that notwithstanding such recognition states (which continue to be major actors in the international arena) have thus far stubbornly refused to permit thirdparty decisionmaking from becoming an effective disputesettlement mechanism. Witness, for example, the discouraging
record of the International Court of Justice in settling inter1 See also U.N. CHARTER chs. VI, VII, and VIII.
2 See Resolutions of the General Assembly at its Twenty-Fifth Regular
Session, 15 September-17 December, 1970, U.N. Press Release GA/4355,
pt. VIII, at 1 (Dec. 17, 1970).
3 46 Stat. 2343; 94 L.N.T.S. 57. The Kellogg-Briand "Pact of Paris" became
effective July 24, 1929. Article 1 reads: 'The High Contracting Parties
solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples that they

condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies,

and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations
with one another."
4 See especially art. 12, 13, 15, and 16 of the Covenant.
5 See especially the preamble and chs. I, VI, VII and VIII of the Charter.
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state conflicts,' or the total collapse of the collective security
machinery and measures in the U.N. Charter,7 which were envisioned as the mainstay of international peace and security.
It is against this background that one should analyze and
evaluate Professor Holton's recommendation to establish an
International Peace Court - a tribunal with compulsory jurisdiction in respect of state-sponsored transnational violence which he believes will be a "first step toward the deterrence
of violence."" For settling international conflicts he prefers a
judicial tribunal to the presently available political forums the Security Council and the General Assembly - because a
tribunal provides "a forum of judgment which features visible
safeguards against obvious partisanship, which excludes the
veto, and which specializes in impartiality." Among the various alternatives - a national court, the International Court of
Justice, and a special tribunal - he favors a permanent peace
court which would constitute a "symbol of deterrence and a
standing reminder of the international community's readiness
for judgment."10
In offering this suggestion Professor Holton challenges the
traditional premise that a state's consent is a prerequisite to
exercising judicial jurisdiction over its international conduct."
He considers "sovereign unaccountability" as an "outmoded
dogma,""'2 which he would replace by compulsory jurisdiction.
Similarly, he would rely more on the moral judgment of the
international community to influence a state's behavior than on
the traditional strategies military, economic, and diplomatic.'" He contends that a significant base of influence, the
people, who have the power of "moral censure," should not be
overlooked. "And this is a power which, if released and channeled, can reach any violator and penetrate the shield of
any material defense.' 4 He offers a new premise: "An
international Peace Court will harness moral power to legal
structure."'
,;For an excellent survey see Gross, The International Court of Justice:
Consideration of Requirements for Enhancing its Role in the International Legal Order, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 253 (1971).

7 See U.N. CHARTER ch. VII.
S T. HOLTON, AN INTERNATIONAL PEACE COURT 17 (1970).
9 Id. at 27.
" Id. at 30.
''Id. at 79-80.
12 Id. at 83.
Id. at 77-78.
Id. at 78.
15 Id. at 79.
'3
14
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In two other areas Professor Holton departs from customary thinking. First, he rejects the premise that "if the great
powers fail to take the initiative against the menace of international violence, the other nations are powerless to take the
initiative." ' Arguing that "[i]nternational participatory democracy is evolving in the assembly of man,"" he observes that
both the authority structure and the resource structure of the
international community are so designed as to allow the other
nations to assume and exercise communal responsibility and
initiative for peace. Secondly, he surmises that the "world
community's immediate need for physical enforcement" is perhaps "less clearly established than its need for authoritative
procedure.' 'ls He anticipates that the "most compelling incentive [to governments] for compliance with the law of peace
and security" might be provided by the "certainty of judgment" that the proposed Peace Court would offer. 19
Professor Holton's new premises form a theoretical foundation for the Peace Court. The court's jurisdiction will extend
to cases of "state-sponsored violence,"20 and both the plaintiff
and the defendant will be states. The court's membership
would be open to all states; it would be "structured for action"
and "the product of the action will be the judgment ... [which
will be] produced in the process of applying the law to a de21
terminate set of facts."
On the nature of the judgment: "the judgment will award
no compensation. It will pronounce no sentence of physical
punishment. But a judgment of censure will constitute an
authoritative condemnation of the responsible party. And when
the responsible party is the government of a sovereign state
this is punishment enough.12 2 Professor Holton believes that
this condemnation should prove effective. In his words: "The
central premise is that the governmental mind is sensitive to
moral power when it is applied. In the present design moral
power is applied by way of concentration through the judicial
process and dissemination through the communication process.
The output of this dual process will be the legal judgment of
2 3
censure broadcast to the world.1
Id. at 76.
at 77.
IsId. at 82.
19 Id. at 82-83.
"0 Id. at 39.
16

17Id.

21
22

23

Id.
Id. at 56.

Id. at 92.
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Professor Holton models the proposed statute of the Peace
Court 2 on the Statutes of the International Court of Justice
and the European Court of Justice. He provides the necessary
due process safeguards, '- , ensures "competence and impartiality
[on the bench] combined with broad cultural and geographical representation,'"-" and suggests elaborate rules for an efficient functioning of such a court.
One could perhaps take issue with Professor Holton's restructured premises. For example, the recent Czechoslovakian,
Cambodian, and Laotian invasions, all vehemently protested,
demonstrate the fragility of moral censure in deterring a state
from using force in its international conduct were it to perceive the issues involved to be of "vital interest." Similarly,
the concept of compulsory jurisdiction without a state's consent is not only without precedent but its practical utility may
also be questionable.
But there are perhaps even more substantive objections
to Professor Holton's bold and innovative proposals. First, it
will be exceedingly hard, if not outright impossible, to establish the facts of state-sponsored violence, especially in view of
the preponderance of the indirect form of aggression through
volunteers and infiltrators. Second, even if sufficient evidence
were produced to show a state sponsorship of violence, the
court might be hard put to pass judgment again a state, for
there is no consensus on what constitutes aggression and what
amounts to permissible self-defense. Third, in a majority of
the current conflicts, it is hard to distinguish between its domestic and international components, for invariably both the elements might be present. If the proposed court's jurisdiction
extends to merely interstate conflicts, it will not be instrumental in accomplishing Professor Holton's goal, that of preventing international violence. On the other hand, to advocate
the extension of the court's jurisdiction to internal conflicts
would be merely an exercise in futility. And finally, there
may even be some validity in the contention that the Western
fascination with the adjudicatory machinery and procedures is
neither as widely nor as enthusiastically shared by other nonWestern cultures and peoples in Asia and Africa.
However, the foregoing comments should not obscure the
fact that Professor Holton's thesis offers an innovative and
24 Id. at 98-109.
25 Id. at 90.
26
Id. at 87.
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imaginative approach which seeks to depart from "customary
nonthinking.""7 Second, his provocative ideas contain valuable
insights both for the scholar and the statesman. And finally, he combines a new model28 with a new approach and
the result is an outstanding study which deserves serious
consideration.
Ved P. Nanda*

Id. at 75.
s A well known model is G. CLARK & L. SOHN, WORLD PEACE THROUGH
LAW (3d. enlarged ed. 1966).
* Professor of Law and Director of International Legal Studies Program,
University of Denver College of Law.
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